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Cancer and the Constitution — Choice at Life’s End
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
J.M. Coetzee’s violent, anti-apartheid Age of Iron,
a novel the Wall Street Journal termed “a fierce pag
eant of modern South Africa,” is written as a let
ter by a retired classics professor, Mrs. Curren,
to her daughter, who lives in the United States.
Mrs. Curren is dying of cancer, and her daughter
advises her to come to the United States for treat
ment. She replies, “I can’t afford to die in Amer
ica. . . . No one can, except Americans.”1 Dying
of cancer has been considered a “hard death” for
at least a century, unproven and even quack rem
edies have been common, and price has been a
secondary consideration. Efforts sponsored by the
federal government to find cures for cancer date
from the establishment of the National Cancer
Institute (NCI) in 1937. Cancer research was in
tensified after President Richard Nixon’s decla
ration of a “war on cancer” and passage of the
National Cancer Act of 1971.2 Most recently,
calls for more cancer research have followed the
announcement by Elizabeth Edwards, wife of pres
idential candidate John Edwards, that her cancer
is no longer considered curable.
Frustration with the methods and slow prog
ress of mainstream medical research has helped
fuel a resistance movement that distrusts both
conventional medicine and government and that
has called for the recognition of a right for ter
minally ill patients with cancer to have access to
any drugs they want to take. Prominent examples
include the popularity of Krebiozen in the 1950s
and of laetrile in the 1970s. As an NCI spokes
person put it more than 20 years ago, when thou
sands of people were calling the NCI hotline
pleading for access to interleukin-2, “What the
callers are saying is, ‘Our mother, our brother,
our sister is dying at this very moment. We have
nothing to lose.’”2 Today, families search the In
ternet for clinical trials, and even untested chem
icals such as dichloroacetate, that seem to offer
them some hope. In addition, basing advocacy on
their personal experiences with cancer, many
408
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families have focused their frustrations on the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which they
see as a government agency denying them access
to treatments they need.
In May 2006 these families won an apparent
major victory when the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in the case of Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach (hereafter referred to as Abigail
Alliance),3 agreed with their argument that patients
with cancer have a constitutional right of access
to investigational cancer drugs. In reaction, the
FDA began the process of rewriting its own regu
lations to make it easier for terminally ill patients
not enrolled in clinical trials to have access to
investigational drugs.4 In November 2006, the
full bench of the Court of Appeals vacated the
May 2006 opinion, and the case was reheard in
March 2007.5 The decision of the full bench, ex
pected by the fall, will hinge on the answer to a
central question: Do terminally ill adult patients
with cancer for whom there are no effective treat
ments have a constitutional right of access to in
vestigational drugs their physicians think might
be beneficial?

the cons tit u tional contr over s y
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel
opmental Drugs (hereafter called the Abigail Alli
ance) sued the FDA to prevent it from enforcing
its policy of prohibiting the sale of drugs that had
not been proved safe and effective to competent
adult patients who are terminally ill and have no
alternative treatment options. The Abigail Alli
ance is named after Abigail Burroughs, whose
squamous-cell carcinoma of the head and neck
was diagnosed when she was only 19 years old.
Two years later, in 2001, she died. Before her
death she had tried unsuccessfully to obtain in
vestigational drugs on a compassionate use basis
from ImClone and AstraZeneca and was accepted
for a clinical trial only shortly before her death.
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Her father founded the Abigail Alliance in her
memory.6
The district court dismissed the Abigail Alli
ance lawsuit. The appeals court, in a two-to-one
opinion written by Judge Judith Rogers, who was
joined by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, reversed the
decision. It concluded that competent, terminally
ill adult patients have a constitutional “right to
access to potentially life-saving post-Phase I in
vestigational new drugs, upon a doctor’s advice,
even where that medicine carries risks for the pa
tient,” and remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the FDA’s current policy
violated that right.3

volve treatment by the government or a
government subsidy. Rather, much as the
guardians of the comatose [sic] patient in
Cruzan did, the Alliance seeks to have the
government step aside by changing its pol
icy so the individual right of self-determi
nation is not violated.3

The appeals court concluded that the Supreme
Court’s 1979 unanimous decision on laetrile,8 in
which the Court concluded that Congress had
made no exceptions in the FDA law for termi
nally ill cancer patients, was not relevant because
laetrile had never been studied in a phase 1 trial
and because the Court did not address the ques
tion of whether terminally ill cancer patients have
the right to life
a constitutional right to take whatever drugs their
The appeals court found that the relevant consti physicians prescribe.
tutional right was determined by the due-process
clause of the Fifth Amendment: “no person shall
the dissent
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property with
out due process of law.” In the court’s words, the Judge Thomas Griffith, the dissenting judge, ar
narrow question presented by Abigail Alliance is gued that the suggested constitutional right sim
whether the due-process clause “protects the right ply does not exist. He noted, for example, that the
of terminally ill patients to make an informed de self-defense cases relied on are examples of “ab
cision that may prolong life, specifically by use stract concepts of personal autonomy,” and can
of potentially life-saving new drugs that the FDA not be used to craft new rights. As to the nation’s
has yet to approve for commercial marketing but history and traditions, he concluded that the
that the FDA has determined, after Phase I clini FDA’s drug-regulatory efforts have been reasona
cal human trials, are safe enough for further test ble responses “to new risks as they are present
ing on a substantial number of human beings.”3 ed.”3 Accepting his argument leaves the majority
The court answered yes, finding that this right resting squarely on Cruzan and the laetrile case.
has deep legal roots in the right to self-defense, As to Cruzan, the dissent argued that “A tradition
and that “Barring a terminally ill patient from of protecting individual freedom from life-saving,
the use of a potentially life-saving treatment im but forced, medical treatment does not evidence
pinges on this right of self-preservation.”3 In a a constitutional tradition of providing affirma
footnote, the court restated this proposition: “The tive access to a potentially harmful, even fatal,
fundamental right to take action, even risky ac commercial good.”3 As to the laetrile case, the
tion, free from government interference, in order judge noted simply that the Court had agreed
to save one’s own life undergirds the court’s de with the FDA that, “For the terminally ill, as for
cision.”3 The court relied primarily on the Cruzan anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for
case,7 in which the Supreme Court recognized inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by
the right of a competent adult to refuse life-sus the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”3,8
taining treatment, including a feeding tube:
Finally, the dissenting judge argued that if the
new constitutional right were accepted, it was too
The logical corollary is that an individual
vague to be applied only to terminally ill patients
must also be free to decide for herself
seeking drugs that had been tested in phase 1 tri
whether to assume any known or unknown
als. Specifically, the judge asked, must the right
risks of taking a medication that might pro
also apply to patients with “serious medical con
long her life. Like the right claimed in Cruzan,
ditions,” to patients who “cannot afford potential
the right claimed by the [Abigail] Alliance
ly life-saving treatment,” or to patients whose
to be free of FDA imposition does not in
physicians believe “marijuana for medicinal pur
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www.nejm.org

july 26, 2007

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 6, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

409

The

n e w e ng l a n d j o u r na l

poses . . . is potentially life saving?”3 In other
words, there is no principled reason to restrict
the constitutional right the majority created to
either terminally ill patients or to post–phase 1
drugs.

discussion
The facts as illustrated by stories of patients dying
of cancer while trying unsuccessfully to enroll in
clinical trials are compelling, and our current
system of ad hoc exceptions is deeply flawed.
The central constitutional issue, however, rests
primarily on determining whether this case is or
is not like the right-to-refuse-treatment case of
Nancy Cruzan, a woman in a permanent vegeta
tive state whose family wanted tube feeding dis
continued because they believed that discontinu
ation was what she would have wanted. I do not
think Abigail Alliance is like Cruzan. Rather, it is sub
stantially identical to cases involving physicianassisted suicide, in which a terminally ill patient
claims a constitutional right of access to physi
cian-prescribed drugs to commit suicide.
The Supreme Court has decided, unanimously,
that no right to physician-prescribed drugs for
suicide exists.9,10 There is no historical tradition
of support for this right. And although the right
seems to be narrowly defined, it is unclear to
whom it should apply — why only to terminally
ill patients? Don’t patients in chronic pain have
even a stronger interest in suicide? Why is the
physician necessary, and why are physician-pre
scribed drugs the only acceptable method of sui
cide? None of these questions can be answered
by examining the Constitution.11
Similarly, in Abigail Alliance, the new constitu
tional right proposed has no tradition in the Unit
ed States, and it cannot be narrowly applied. For
example, why should a constitutional right apply
only to people who have a particular medical
status? And why should a physician be involved
at all? If patients have a right to autonomy, why
isn’t the requirement of a government-licensed
physician’s recommendation at least as burden
some as the requirement of the FDA’s approval
of the investigational drug? And why would the
Constitution apply only to investigational drugs
for which phase 1 trials have been completed?
Why not include access to investigational medical
devices, like the artificial heart, or even to Sched
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ule I controlled substances, like marijuana or ly
sergic acid diethylamide (LSD)? If it is a constitu
tional right, these should be available too, at least
unless the state can demonstrate a “compelling
interest” in regulating them.
My prediction is that after rehearing this case
en banc, the full Circuit Court will reject the po
sition of the Abigail Alliance for the same rea
sons that the Supreme Court rejected the “right”
of terminally ill patients to have access to physi
cian-prescribed drugs they could use to end their
lives.9-11 To decide otherwise would entirely un
dermine the legitimacy of the FDA. Patients in
the United States have always had a right to re
fuse any medical treatment, but we have never
had a right to demand mistreatment, inappropri
ate treatment, or even investigational or experi
mental interventions. This will not, however, be
the end of the matter. After the physician-assist
ed–suicide cases, the fight appropriately shifted
to the states, although so far only one, Oregon,
has provided its physicians with immunity for
prescribing life-ending drugs to their competent,
terminally ill patients.12 In the Abigail Alliance
case, the debate will continue in the forum in
which it began — the FDA — and in Congress.

congre ss
Congressional action also had its birth with the
story of one patient with cancer and was also
heavily influenced by another individual patient
involved in a controversy over removal of a feed
ing tube. “Terri’s Law” was enacted in Florida in
2003 to try to prevent the removal of a feeding
tube from Terri Schiavo; the case was substan
tially similar to Cruzan. Terri’s case gained nation
al attention 2 years later.13 In the midst of it, in
March 2005, the Wall Street Journal asserted, in an
editorial titled “How About a ‘Kianna’s Law’?,”
“If Terri Schiavo deserves emergency federal inter
vention to save her life, people like Kianna Karnes
deserve it even more.”14 At the time, Kianna Karnes
was a 44-year-old mother of four who was dying
of kidney cancer. Her only hope of survival, ac
cording to the editorial, was to gain access to one
of two experimental drugs in clinical trials, but
neither of the two companies running the trials
(Bayer and Pfizer) would make the drugs avail
able to her on a compassionate-use basis. This
was because, according to the Wall Street Journal,

www.nejm.org

july 26, 2007

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 6, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

health law, ethics, and human rights

the FDA “makes it all but impossible” for the
manufacturers “to provide [drugs] to terminal pa
tients on a ‘compassionate use’ basis.”14
Almost immediately after the editorial was
published, both drug manufacturers contacted
Kianna’s physicians to discuss releasing the drugs
to her. But within 2 days after publication, she
was dead. The Wall Street Journal editorialized, “Isn’t
it a national scandal that cancer sufferers should
have to be written about in the Wall Street Journal
to be offered legal access to emerging therapies
once they’ve run out of other options?”15 It not
ed that Mrs. Karnes’ father, John Rowe — him
self a survivor of leukemia — was working with
the Abigail Alliance on a “Kianna’s Law.” That
law, formally titled the “Access, Compassion, Care,
and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act” or the
“ACCESS Act,” was introduced in November 2005
and is an attempt to make it much easier for seri
ously ill patients to gain access to experimental
drugs.16,17
The act begins with a series of congressional
findings, including that “Seriously ill patients
have a right to access available investigational
drugs, biological products, and devices.” The act
permits the sponsor to apply for approval to make
an investigational drug, biologic product, or de
vice available on the basis of data from a complet
ed phase 1 trial, “preliminary evidence that the
product may be effective against a serious or lifethreatening condition or disease,” and an assur
ance that the clinical trial will continue.17 The
patient, who must have exhausted all approved
treatments, must provide written informed con
sent and must also sign “a written waiver of the
right to sue the manufacturer or sponsor of the
drug, biological product, or device, or the physi
cians who prescribed the product or the institu
tion where it was administered, for an adverse
event caused by the product, which shall be bind
ing in every State and Federal court.”17
Although Congress is the proper forum to ad
dress this issue, this initial attempt has some of
the same problems as the Abigail Alliance decision:
the patients to whom it applies are ambiguously
classified, and clinical research seems to be equat
ed with clinical care. Also troubling is that the
patients (and would-be subjects) are asked to as
sume all of the risks of the uncontrolled experi
ments, and current rules of research — which
protect subjects by prohibiting mandatory waiv

n engl j med 357;4

ers of rights — are jettisoned, with the require
ment of such waivers becoming the price of ob
taining the investigational agent from an otherwise
reluctant drug company.

fda pr op os al
In direct response to Abigail Alliance, the FDA pro
posed amending its rules to encourage more drug
companies to offer their investigational drugs
through compassionate-use programs.4 These pro
grams first came into prominence during the
early days of infection with the human immuno
deficiency virus (HIV) and AIDS, when there were
no effective treatments and AIDS activists insist
ed that they have early access to investigational
drugs because, in the words of their inaccurate
slogan, “A Research Trial Is Treatment Too.”18
Because the FDA could not stand the political
pressure generated by the activists, the compas
sionate-use program was developed as a kind of
political safety valve to provide enough exceptions
to save their basic research rules. In early Decem
ber 2006, the FDA continued this political-safetyvalve approach by issuing new proposed regula
tions with a title that could have been taken
directly from the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Pow
er (ACT-UP): “Expanded Access to Investigational
Drugs for Treatment Use.”19
The FDA’s expanded-access proposal applies
to “seriously ill patients when there is no com
parable or satisfactory alternative therapy to diag
nose, monitor, or treat the patient’s disease or
condition.”4 Manufacturers are required to file
an “expanded access submission,” and the prod
uct must be administered or dispensed by a li
censed physician who will be considered an “in
vestigator,” with all the reporting requirements
that role entails.3
Whether or not the proposal is adopted, it will
do little to increase access, since the major bottle
neck in the compassionate-use program has nev
er been the FDA. The manufacturers have no in
centives to make their investigational products
available outside clinical trials. This is because
direct access to investigational drugs by individu
als may make it more difficult to recruit research
subjects, and thus to conduct the clinical trials
necessary for drug approval, and could also sub
ject the drug manufacturer to liability for serious
adverse reactions. Even without a lawsuit, a seri
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ous reaction to a drug outside a trial could ad
versely affect the trial itself.4,16,20 The drug com
panies are right to worry that the approaches of
the judiciary, Congress, and the FDA will prob
ably make clinical trials more difficult to con
duct, because few seriously ill patients who have
exhausted conventional treatments would rather
be randomly assigned to an investigational drug
than have a guarantee that they will receive the
investigational drug their physician recommends
for them. This could result in significant delays in
the approval and overall availability of drugs that
demonstrate effectiveness — a result no one fa
vors. Even if patients with cancer are willing buy
ers, drug manufacturers are not willing sellers.

physicians and patient s
The cover story for all the proposed changes is
patients’ choice. But without scientific evidence
of the risks and benefits of a drug, choice can
not be informed, and for seriously ill patients,
fear of death will predictably overcome fear of
unknown risks. This is understandable. As psy
chiatrist Jay Katz, the leading scholar on informed
consent, has noted, when medical science seems
impotent to fight nature, “all kinds of senseless
interventions are tried in an unconscious effort to
cure the incurable magically through a ‘wonder
drug,’ a novel surgical procedure, or a penetrating
psychological interpretation.”21 Another Wall Street
Journal article, entitled “Saying No to Penelope,”22
illustrates the impossibility of limiting access to
unproven cancer drugs to competent adults. The
article tells the story of 4-year-old Penelope, who
is dying from neuroblastoma that has proved re
sistant to all conventional treatments. Her par
ents seek “anything [that] has a prayer of saving
her.” In her father’s words, “The chance of any
thing bringing her back from the abyss now is
very low. But the only thing I know for sure is
if we don’t treat her, she will die.” With Penelope
hospitalized and in pain, her parents continue
“searching Penelope’s big brown eyes for clues as
to how long she wants to continue to battle for
life.”
It is suggested that the requirement of a phy
sician’s recommendation can safeguard against
“magical thinking” and help make informed con
sent real.23 But as Katz has noted, although phy
sicians (and, he could have added, drug compa
nies) often justify such last-ditch interventions as
412
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simply being responsive to patient needs, the in
terventions “may turn out to be a projection of
their own needs onto patients.”21

government and the marke t
Another recurrent theme is the belief that gov
ernment regulation is evil, a central tenet of the
laetrile litigation of the 1970s. The court hearing
Abigail Alliance was correct to note that laetrile
never underwent a phase 1 trial, but every indica
tion was that the drug, also known as vitamin
B17, was harmless, albeit also ineffective against
cancer. Laetrile became a legal cause celebre in
1972, when California physician John A. Richard
son was prosecuted for promoting laetrile. Rich
ardson was a member of the John Birch Society,
which quickly formed the Committee for Freedom
of Choice in Cancer Therapy, with more than 100
committees nationwide.24 It took another 7 years
before the FDA prevailed in its case against lae
trile before the Supreme Court.8 The basic argu
ments against FDA regulation remain the same
today: the FDA follows a “paternalistic public
policy that prevents individuals from exercising
their own judgment about risks and benefits. If
the FDA must err, it should be on the side of
patients’ freedom to choose.”25

public p olic y
The FDA will prevail again today, not only be
cause there is no constitutional right of access to
unapproved drugs but also because even if there
were, the state has the same compelling interest
in approving drugs as it has in licensing physi
cians. From a public policy view, the Abigail Alliance court, the Congress, and the FDA all seem
to be suffering from the “therapeutic illusion” in
which research, designed to test a hypothesis for
society, is confused with treatment, administered
in the best interests of individual patients.21,26,27
Of course there is a continuum, and it is perfectly
understandable that many patients with cancer,
told that there is nothing conventional medicine
can do for them, will want access to whatever is
available in or outside the context of clinical tri
als. But this is a problem for patients, physicians,
the FDA, and drug manufacturers. First, because
terminally ill patients can be harmed and exploit
ed, there are better and worse ways to die.21,26
Second, it is only through research, not “treat
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ment,” that cancer may become a chronic illness
that is treated with a complex array of drugs,
given either together or in a progression.28,29 The
right to choose in medicine is a central right of
patients, but the choices can and should be lim
ited to reasonable medical alternatives, which
themselves are based on evidence.
This is, I believe, good public policy. But it is
also much easier said than done.30 Death is
feared and even dreaded in our culture, and few
Americans are able to die at home, at peace,
with our loved ones in attendance, without seek
ing the “latest new treatment.” There always
seems to be something new to try, and there is
almost always anecdotal evidence that it could
help. This is one reason that even extremely high
prices do not affect demand for cancer drugs,
even ones that add little or no survival time.31,32
When does caring for the patient demand pri
mary attention to palliation rather than to longshot, high-risk, investigational interventions? Coet
zee’s Mrs. Curren, who rejected new medical
treatment for her cancer and insisted on dying at
home, told her physician, whom she saw as “with
drawing” from her after giving her a terminal
prognosis — “His allegiance to the living, not
the dying” — “I have no illusions about my con
dition, doctor. It is not [experimental] care I need,
just help with the pain.”1
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was re
ported.
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston.
1. Coetzee JM. Age of iron. London: Seeker & Warburg, 1990.
2. Patterson JT. The dread disease: cancer and modern Ameri

can culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987.
3. Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (DC Cir
2006). Vacated 469 F.3d 129 (DC Cir 2006).
4. Proposed rules for charging for investigational drugs and
expanded access to investigational drugs for treatment use.
Rockville, MD: Food and Drug Administration, 2006. (Accessed
July 6, 2007, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/
IND_PR.htm.)
5. Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 429 F.3d 129 (DC Cir
2006).
6. Jacobson PD, Parmet WE. A new era of unapproved drugs:
the case of Abigail Alliance v Von Eschenbach. JAMA 2007;297:
205-8.

n engl j med 357;4

7. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261

(1990).
8. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
9. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
10. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
11. Annas GJ. The bell tolls for a constitutional right to assisted
suicide. N Engl J Med 1997;337:1098-103.
12. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
13. Annas GJ. “I want to live”: medicine betrayed by ideology in
the political debate over Terri Schiavo. Stetson Law Rev 2005;35:
49-80.
14. How about a “Kianna’s Law”? Wall Street Journal. March 24,
2005:A14.
15. Kianna’s legacy. Wall Street Journal. March 29, 2005:Al4.
16. Groopman J. The right to a trial: should dying patients have
access to experimental drugs? The New Yorker. December 18,
2006:40-7.
17. ACCESS Act (Access, Compassion, Care, and Ethics for Seri
ously Ill Patients), S. 1956, 109th Cong (2005).
18. Annas GJ. Faith (healing), hope and charity at the FDA: the
politics of AIDS drug trials. Villanova Law Rev 1989;34:771-97.
19. FDA proposes rules overhaul to expand availability of ex
perimental drugs: the agency also clarifies permissible charges
to patients. Rockville, MD: Food and Drug Administration, De
cember 11, 2006. (Accessed July 6, 2007, at http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01520.html.)
20. Prud’homme A. The cell game: Sam Waksal’s fast money and
false promises — and the fate of ImClone’s cancer drug. New
York: Harper Business, 2004.
21. Katz J. The silent world of doctor and patient. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1984:151.
22. Anand G. Saying no to Penelope: father seeks experimental
cancer drug, but a biotech firm says risk is too high. Wall Street
Journal. May 1, 2007:A1.
23. Robertson J. Controversial medical treatment and the right
to health care. Hastings Cent Rep 2006;36:15-20.
24. Culbert ML. Vitamin B17: Forbidden weapon against cancer.
New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1974.
25. Miller HI. Paternalism costs lives. Wall Street Journal. March
2, 2006:A15.
26. Annas GJ. The changing landscape of human experimenta
tion: Nuremberg, Helsinki, and beyond. Health Matrix J Law
Med 1992;2:119-40.
27. Appelbaum PS, Lidz CW. Re-evaluating the therapeutic mis
conception: response to Miller and Joffe. Kennedy Inst Ethics J
2006;16:367-73.
28. Nathan D. The cancer treatment revolution: how smart drugs
and other therapies are renewing our hope and changing the
face of medicine. New York: John Wiley, 2007.
29. Brugarolas J. Renal-cell carcinoma — molecular pathways
and therapies. N Engl J Med 2007;356:185-6.
30. Callahan D. False hopes: why America’s quest for perfect
health is a recipe for failure. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1998.
31. Berenson A. Hope, at $4,200 a dose: why a cancer drug’s cost
doesn’t hurt demand. New York Times. October 1, 2006:BU1.
32. Anand G. From Wall Street, a warning about cancer drug
prices. Wall Street Journal. March 15, 2007:A1.
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society.

www.nejm.org

july 26, 2007

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on December 6, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

413

